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7 November 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*USSR: Kosygin's speech in Moscow yesterday at the traditional ceremonies marking the Bolshevik Revolution anniversary contained no indications that Soviet leaders are considering any major changes in the main lines of their foreign and domestic policies as a result of the Cuban affair.

His stress on peaceful coexistence and negotiations to settle disputes suggests that Moscow plans no major initiatives in the near future, and that it will concentrate now on repairing the damage to Soviet prestige caused by Khrushchev's backdown and on restoring an image of Bloc strength and solidarity before embarking on new negotiations on such issues as Berlin, disarmament, and a nuclear test ban.

Kosygin did not repeat the references to a detente between NATO and Warsaw Pact powers and negotiations on other issues contained in Khrushchev's letters of 27 and 28 October to President Kennedy.

Although Kosygin conceded that the US as well as the USSR had exercised self-control and responsibility "at the critical moment" in the Cuban crisis, he credited the Soviet Union with taking measures to liquidate the conflict. He replied to unnamed critics

who ask if Soviet concessions were "worthwhile" by pointing out that both sides made concessions and by denying that Moscow "gave in."

Kosygin accorded minimum attention to Berlin and German problems. He did not mention a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but said only that the Soviet people do not want to wait indefinitely for firm guarantees against a "repetition of German aggression." He devoted even less attention to disarmament, emphasizing instead the theme of Soviet readiness to "deal a crushing repulse" to aggressors.

His remarks on the Sino-Indian dispute appear to represent a cautious step back toward Moscow's earlier position of neutrality as compared with its public endorsement on 25 October of Peiping's proposals for a 12-mile mutual withdrawal of Indian and Chinese forces and heads-of-government negotiations. This shift probably reflects Moscow's irritation with Peiping's increasingly pointed censure of Khrushchev's behavior in the Cuban crisis.

In discussing the Soviet economy, Kosygin stated that industrial production is expected to increase this year by "over 9 percent" as compared to the 8.1-percent increase planned. But there was little to comfort the Soviet consumer in his sparse references to light industrial developments. Moreover, his forecast for new housing in 1962 was nearly 15 percent under the target set for this year. Kosygin claimed that the USSR "has never had so much grain." According to our estimates, however, this year's Soviet harvest probably will prove little if any larger than last year's mediocre one.

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Guatemala: Results of the 4 November mayoralty election in Guatemala City indicate growing strength of the extreme left.

An extreme leftist supported by followers of anti-US former President Juan Arevala, who is already campaigning for re-election in 1963, was barely defeated by a dark-horse candidate, possibly supported by President Ydigoras. The pattern of the results also indicates voter repudiation of conservative and traditional parties, whose candidate ran a poor third.

The fourth ranking among eight candidates ran with open Communist support. [redacted]

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[redacted]
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